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I. INTRODUCTION
The go-go financial markets of the 1980s have come to a crashing
halt in a flood of litigation. Actions which seemed bold and daring
during those prosperous times are viewed as reckless in the current
recession. Among the more difficult issues faced by the courts is de-
termining which of the creative transactions of the 1980s the Federal
Securities laws should protect. Courts must make the more difficult
of these determinations when analyzing instruments labeled "notes."
The Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act) includes in its definition of a
security "any note."' The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 includes
in its definition any note, except notes with a maturity of nine
months or less.2 The courts have universally agreed that the intro-
ductory language "unless the context otherwise requires" in both def-
* Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. J.D., Luckman Dis-
tinguished Teaching Fellow, Pepperdine University School of Law, 1978; LL.M., New
York University, 1979. The author served as staff attorney in the Division of Enforce-
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** Judicial Clerk, Judge Gilbert S. Merritt, United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit, 1992-93; J.D. magna cum laude Pepperdine University, 1992; B.A.
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1. Section 2 of the 1933 Act provides,
When used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires-
(1) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, de-
benture, evidence of indebtedness... or any certificate of interest or partici-
pation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of or
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (West 1981) (emphasis added).
2. Section 3 of the 1934 Act provides:
(a) When used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires-
(10) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, de-
benture... but shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange,
or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not ex-
ceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the
maturity of which is likewise limited.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (West 1981).
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initions, read in light of the wide variety of transactions which are
evidenced by "notes," means that not all notes are "securities" under
these acts. "Some notes, such as publicly offered and traded long-
term corporate notes, are clearly securities and some, such as resi-
dential mortgage or consumer finance notes, are just as clearly not."3
Difficulty arises with regard to the vast number of instruments
which are not so clearly categorized.4 The circuit courts have spent
more than two decades struggling to develop an adequate definition
to separate security notes from non-security notes, with little success.
In 1990, the United States Supreme Court heard this issue for the
first time in Reves v. Ernst & Young.5 In its opinion, the court at-
tempted to reconcile several different tests which were being utilized
by the circuit courts. Unfortunately, as commentators have noted,
the test adopted by the court has created as much confusion as it
eliminated.6
This paper will examine the Reves opinion and the problems that
have arisen from its application. Part I examines the history of the
various tests used by the circuit courts prior to the decision in Reves.
Part II briefly analyzes the test adopted in Reves. Part III examines
the application of the test by the lower courts, and the inconsisten-
cies which have resulted. Finally, Part IV proposes an alternative
analysis of the issue which could lead to more consistent predictable
results.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The definitions of a security contained in the 1933 and 1934 Acts
encompass a broad range of investment instruments. However,
courts have recognized that Congress did not "intend to provide a
broad federal remedy for all fraud."7  Both definitions consist of a
large laundry list of instruments which are securities, unless "the
context otherwise requires."8 Courts have established several tests to
3. Brief for the Respondent at 20, Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990)
(No. 88-1480).
4. See Brief for North American Securities Administrators Ass'n Inc. at 7-10,
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990) (No. 88-1480).
5. 494 U.S. 56 (1990) (cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1165 (1992) [hereinafter subsequent
history omitted].
6. James D. Gordon III, Interplanetary Intelligence About Promissory Notes as
Securities, 69 TEX. L. REV. 383, 402-04 (1990); Randall W. Quinn, After Reves v. Ernst &
Young, When Are Certificates of Deposit "Notes" Subject to Rule 10b-5 of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act? 46 THE Bus. LAW. 173 (1990); Marc I. Steinberg, Notes as Securities:
Reves and Its Implications, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 675, 678-85 (1990).
7. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982). For a complete examination
of the procedural benefits which accompany coverage by the securities acts, see Harlan
S. Abrahams, Commercial Notes and Definition of 'Security' under Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934: A Note is a Note is a Note? 52 NEB. L. REV. 478, 508-510 (1973).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 77a, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (West 1981). See supra notes 1 and 2.
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apply this context clause to different financial transactions and in-
struments. Regarding instruments labeled "stock," the Supreme
Court in Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth9 recognized an extremely
strong presumption in favor of coverage by the acts.10 In SEC v. W.J.
Howey Co.,11 the Supreme Court developed a definitive test to deter-
mine when a transaction constituted an "investment contract," and
consequently a security.12 Courts have successfully applied the
Howey test for forty-five years. However, a workable test for deter-
mining when a "note" should be considered a security eluded the
courts.
Prior to the decision in Reves, the United States circuit courts had
adopted four different tests to determine whether a note should be
considered a security.13 These tests were similar in that they at-
tempted to determine the "economic realities" of the transaction.14
Yet there were enough differences that an examination of the issue
by the Supreme Court was necessary to ensure consistency. It is
helpful to review briefly the application of these other tests in order
to fully understand the high court's actions in Reves and the subse-
quent application of that opinion by the lower courts.
A. The "Howey" Investment Contract Test
The Eighth Circuit and District of Columbia Circuit applied the
aforementioned Howey test to notes as well as investment con-
tracts.15 The Howey test requires the satisfaction of four factors. A
9. 471 U.S. 681 (1985).
10. Id at 686-37. The court in Landreth held that the Act would cover any stock
bearing the common characteristics of stock. Id. at 686. These characteristics include
voting rights, the right to collect dividends based upon corporate profitability, and eq-
uity rights upon liquidation. Id. For an example of application of this test, see 22 SE-
CURITIES REG. AND LAW REP. 1226 (1990) (discussing an SEC no action letter dated 7/
30/90).
11. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
12. Id at 298-99. The Court held that "an investment contract for purposes of the
Securities Act means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his
money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of
the promoter or a third party." Id.
13. These four tests are: The Commercial/Investment Dichotomy test, infra notes
21-24 and accompanying text; The Risk Capital Test, infra notes 25-27 and accompany-
ing text; The Howey investment contract test, infra notes 15-20 and accompanying
text; and The Family Resemblance Test, infra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
14. This approach is based largely on the suggestions of an article by Professor
Ronald Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security" Is There a More Meaningful
Formula?, 18 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 367 (1967).
15. As noted above, this test is derived from the Supreme Court's decision in SEC
v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
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contract must involve:
(1) the investment of money,
(2) in a common enterprise,
(3) for profit,
(4) based upon the managerial efforts of others. 16
Some authorities suggest that the Supreme Court added a fifth prong
to this test in Marine Bank v. Weaver:17 whether an alternative reg-
ulatory scheme existed to protect investors.' 8
The problem with this test was that it was intended to define an
investment contract, which is a very different instrument from a
note.19 For example, the fourth factor of the Howey test is intended
to separate passive from active common enterprises. Yet profits de-
rived from notes are always "based upon the managerial efforts of
others." Therefore, application of the fourth Howey factor adds
nothing to an analysis of the investment nature of the note.20
B. The Commercial/Investment Dichotomy Test
The Third, Fifth, Seventh and Tenth Circuits attempted to deter-
mine the "economic realities" of a note transaction by using indepen-
dently developed lists of factors. Each of these circuits referred to
their analysis as the Commercial/Investment Dichotomy test. The
makeup of this test, however, varied from circuit to circuit, and
sometimes from case to case. The Tenth Circuit looked at:
(1) use of proceeds to buy specific assets or services (commercial) rather than
general financing (investment), (2) risk to initial investment, (3) giving certain
rights to a payee (investment), (4) repayment contingent on profit or out of
production (investment), (5) a large number of notes or payees (investment),
(6) a large dollar amount (investment), (7) fixed time notes (equivocal) rather
than demand notes (commercial), and (8) characterization by the parties
themselves. 2
1
The Seventh Circuit suggested that the following factors helped,
but that in the end a court must judge each case on its facts:
(1) how is the instrument characterized in the business community? (2) how
are the proceeds to be used (if for consumer goods or particular business
goods or services-not covered, but if for general financing of borrower's en-
terprise--covered) (3) extent of reliance on efforts of others (placing funds at
16. See, Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 856 F.2d 52, 54 (8th Cir. 1988) rev'd sub
nom. Reves v. Ernst and Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990); Accord Baurer v. Planning Group,
Inc., 669 F.2d 770 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
17. 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
18. See Gordon III, supra note 6, at 385.
19. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 64. Justice Marshall argues that,
"[t]o hold that a 'note' is not a 'security' unless it meets a test designed for an entirely
different variety of intrument 'would make the Acts' enumeration of many types of
instruments superfluous... Id. (citing Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S.
681, 692 (1985).
20. For a full discussion of the Howey test and its application to investment con-
tracts, see Scott FitzGibbon, What Is a Security?-A Redefinition Based on Eligibility
to Participate in the Financial Markets, 64 MINN. L. REv. 893 (1980).
21. Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546, 551 n.9 (10th Cir. 1974).
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great risk, giving note payee extensive collateral rights, and making repay-
ment of funds contingent upon some event all tend to indicate security rather
than loan); (4) number of notes issued, number of payees, dollar amount of
transaction; (5) payable on demand or, if payable at fixed time, how long is
the time between issuance and maturity? and (6) characterization of notes on
relevant financial statements.
2 2
The Fifth Circuit also adopted the Commercial/Investment Dichot-
omy test; however, it limited its discussion to two factors which the
court found generally present when a note constituted a security.23
The key factors, according to that court were (1) whether the note
was offered to a large class of investors, or acquired by the purchaser
for speculation or investment (implying an investment), and (2)
whether the note was given in exchange for a loan to pay off general
business debt. ' ,24
C. The Risk Capital Test
The Ninth and Sixth Circuits utilized the Risk Capital test, some-
times in conjunction with and sometimes instead of the commercial/
investment dichotomy test. This test analyzed "the nature and de-
gree of risk accompanying the transaction to the party providing the
funds" to determine "whether the funding party invested 'risk capi-
tal.' "25 To answer this question, the courts tried to distinguish be-
tween risky loans and risk capital.26 These circuits considered only
transactions involving the latter as investment securities. To make
this determination, these courts looked at a number of factors,
including:
1) length of time the funds are at risk; (2) collateralization; (3) form of the
obligation; (4) circumstances of the issuance; (5) relationship between amount
borrowed and size of borrower's business; and (6) contemplated use of
funds.2 7
22. C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G & G Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354, 1361 (7th Cir.
1975) (quoting, Comment, Commercial Notes and Definition of "Security" Under Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934: A Note Is a Note Is a Note? 52 NEB. L. REV. 478, 510-24
(1973).
23. See McClure v. First Nat'l Bank of Lubbock, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974).
24. Id at 493-94.
25. Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1256-57 (9th Cir. 1976)
(citing El Khadem v. Equity Securities Corp., 494 F.2d 1224, 1229 (9th Cir. 1973)).
26. Id. at 1257 (quoting Motel Co. v. Commissioner, 340 F.2d 445, 446 (2d Cir.
1965)).
27. Danner v. Himmelfarb, 858 F.2d 515, 519 n.3 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Great West-
ern Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976)); see also American Bank &
Trust Co. v. Wallace, 702 F.2d 93, 96 (6th Cir. 1983).
1127
C. The Family Resemblance Test
Finally, the Second Circuit adopted a test it labeled the Family Re-
semblance test. This test begins by reviewing the plain language in
both the 1933 and 1934 Acts, specifically the words "any note."28 This
language by itself implies a presumption of coverage for any instru-
ment called a note.29 However, the courts recognized that certain
notes are clearly commercial in nature and securities laws intended
to protect the investing public should not govern.30 Therefore, by de-
termining that a note belonged to a family of non-security notes, de-
fendants could rebut this presumption. The court in Exchange
National Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co. 31 developed a list of
members of the family, including:
(1) the note delivered in consumer financing, (2) the note secured by a mort-
gage on a home, the short-term note secured by a lien on a small business or
some of its assets, (3) the note evidencing a 'character' loan to a bank cus-
tomer, (4) short-term notes secured by an assignment of accounts receivable,
or (5) a note which simply formalizes an open-account debt incurred in the
ordinary course of business (particularly if, as in the case of the customer of a
broker, it is collateralized). 32
Unless the examined note bears a "strong family resemblance" to
one of the instruments on this list, it constitutes a security covered by
the Acts.33
Again, looking to the plain language of the act, however, the Sec-
ond Circuit recognized that the short-term exemption in section
3(a)(10) eliminated the presumption of coverage for some "notes."
Zeller v. Bogue Electric Manufacturing Corp.3 4 determined which
short-term notes the Act would exempt through application of this
exemption. The court in Zeller adopted the distinction drawn in an
SEC Release that:
[t]he legislative history of the Act makes clear that section 3(a)(3) applies only
to prime quality negotiable commercial paper of a type not ordinarily
purchased by the general public, that is, paper used to facilitate well-recog-
nized types of current operational business requirements and of a type eligible
for discounting by Federal Reserve banks.
3 5
28. Exchange Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1131 (2d
Cir. 1976).
29. Id. at 1131-33. Actually, the Second Circuit applied this presumption only to
notes which did not fall within the short-term exception of the Acts. Id. at 1132.
30. Id. at 1133-35; see also Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 452 F.2d 662 (2d
Cir. 1971); Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 908 (1973).
31. 544 F.2d 1126 (2nd Cir. 1976).
32. Id. at 1138.
33. Id. The Second Circuit declined to explore fully the impact of the exclusion of
notes with a maturity of nine months or less on the test. However, the implication is
that the presumption would shift, but that it could be rebutted, and such notes could
be governed by the act if they were clearly investment in nature. Id. at 1138 n.19.
34. 476 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973).
35. Id. at 799-800, (quoting Exchange Act Release No. 4412, 26 Fed. Reg. 9158, 9159
(1961)).
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Although this narrowing of the short-term exception seems logical
given the legislative history of the Acts, it has become quite contro-
versial in subsequent opinions, including Reves.
III. THE REVES OPINION
Finally in 1989, the United States Supreme Court granted certio-
rari to the Eighth Circuit in order to alleviate the confusion in choos-
ing from among various tests.36 The majority opinion, written by
Justice Marshall, set down a uniform test for determining which
notes constitute securities. 37 Unfortunately, the test he devised is
filled with enough ambiguities that its application has led to widely
varying results.S3
Reves v. Ernst & Young39 involved holders of demand notes issued
by the Farmer's Cooperative of Arkansas and Oklahoma, which had
filed for bankruptcy.40 The note holders sued the accounting firm
which audited the co-op under the antifraud provision of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act.41 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the
issue of whether the notes were securities within the meaning of
both the Arkansas and Federal securities laws.4 2
The majority opinion first looked to the statutory definition of "se-
curity." 43 Next, the Court examined some of the past decisions, in-
36. Reves v. Arthur Young & Co., 490 U.S. 1105 (1989) (Mem. opinion granting
certiorari). The accounting firm of Arthur Young was the original defendant in the
case. However, pending appeal, the firm merged with another accounting firm, Ernst
and Whinney to form Ernst and Young, hence the name change.
37. Justice Marshall authored a number of securities opinions in addition to his
more well known civil rights decisions. In addition to Reves he wrote five other major
securities opinions during the last ten years of his tenure. See 23 Securities Reg. and
Law Report 1028 (1991).
38. See section III infra.
39. 494 U.S. 56 (1990).
40. Id, at 59.
41. Id The note holders claimed that Arthur Young was liable for aiding and
abetting a 10b-5 violation by the cooperative. The accountants had failed to follow ac-
cepted accounting purposes, and the plaintiff class alleged that had they done so, the
shaky financial position of the co-op would have been exposed.
42. The specific question presented to the court by the Petitioners was, "Did the
Eighth Circuit err when it held, in conflict with other courts of appeals, that uninsured
demand notes sold to thousands of passive investors are not 'securities'?" Petition for
Writ of Certiorari at i, Reves v. Ernst and Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990) (No. 88-1480). The
petition emphasized the split among the circuits in its petition. Id. at 3-5.
43. 494 U.S. at 62. The Court deals only with the definition in section 3(a)(10) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, since it is that act which the plaintiffs invoke.
However, since this definition is virtually identical to the definition in section 2(1) of
the Securities Act of 1933, but with the added exclusion for short term securities, any
1129
terpreting and limiting the application of the Acts to the laundry list
of items in this definition. In particular, the opinion focused on the
holding in Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth44 in which the Court
laid down the test to determine whether a "stock" is a security.45
The Landreth opinion held that since "stock" is "the paradigm of a
security,"46 a plaintiff need only show that the instrument was called
stock and had the "common characteristics of stock" to establish that
the securities laws governed the instrument.47 However, a note does
not encompass the same investment-i.e., characteristics of stock-
according to Marshall, and therefore, the Court needed to adopt a
more demanding test to distinguish securities from non-securities. 48
In search of such a test, the Court examined the variety of tests
previously adopted by the circuits. Of the possibilities, the Court con-
cluded that the "family resemblance test is the best."49 It accepted
the Second Circuit's interpretation of the statutory definition of se-
curity, that the language "any note" establishes a presumption that a
note is a security.50 However, the Second Circuit's presumption ap-
plied only to notes with a maturity of more than nine months, based
upon "its interpretation of the statutory exception for notes with a
maturity of nine months or less."51 Justice Marshall neither adopted
nor accepted this interpretation, leaving an unanswered question
which has led to confusion among the lower courts.52 Even when the
instrument which would be a security under the 1934 Act would presumably qualify
under the 1933 act as well.
44. 471 U.S. 681 (1985).
45. What the majority opinion fails to mention is that it laid the basis for Reves in
Landreth by stating, "We here expressly leave until another day the question whether
'notes' or 'bonds' or some other category of instrument listed in the definition might be
shown 'by proving [only] the document itself.' " Landreth, 471 U.S. at 694 (quoting SEC
v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 355 (1943)).
46. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 693 (quoting Daily v. Morgan, 701 F.2d 496, 500 (5th Cir.
1983)).
47. Id. at 690.
48. Reves, 494 U.S. at 63. The court states that "[wihile common stock is the quin-
tessence of a security, and investors therefore justifiably assume that a sale of stock is
covered by the Securities Acts, the same simply cannot be said of notes, which are used
in a variety of settings." Id. at 62 (citation omitted).
49. Id. at 65. The majority rejected the application of the Howey test, finding it
appropriate for defining an investment contract, but not an investment-oriented note.
Id. The risk-capital test is mentioned only parenthetically as "virtually identical to the
Howeij test." Id. Finally, the Court states that the two remaining tests, commercial/
investment and family resemblance, are essentially the same approach, with the latter
being slightly more "promising." Id. Therefore, the winner is...the family resem-
blance test.
50. Id. at 65.
51. Id. at 65 n.3.
52. Id. n.3. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text. See also Marc I. Steinberg,
Notes as Securities. Reves and Its Implications, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 675, 681-82 (1990) (dis-
cussing the confusion associated with notes exceeding nine months).
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presumption clearly applies, however, it is rebuttable.53 The majority
found that the judicially crafted list of securities established by the
Second Circuit insufficiently determines whether the presumption is
rebutted, and "more guidance is needed." 54 To provide this guidance,
it looked at what characteristics made the listed instruments non-se-
curities, then fashioned factors to apply to each note to determine
whether it possessed these same characteristics. If the note satisfies
these factors, the new instrument should be added to the list and the
securities laws would not govern it.55 Four factors comprise the test:
1) the motivations of the buyer and seller 5 6
2) the plan of distribution 5 7
3) the reasonable expectations of the investing public 5 8
4) the presence of other risk-reducing factors.5 9
By using these factors, the Court found that the notes issued by the
co-op were "securities" and therefore covered by the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934.60
Only after having reached this conclusion did the Court address
the crucial issue in the decision of the court below-the effect of the
demand feature of the notes.61 The Securities Exchange Act specifi-
53. Reves, 494 U.S. at 65. The Court noted that the presumption must be rebutta-
ble to be consistent with the limited purpose of the securities regulations. Id.
54. Id.
55. I&
56. Id. at 65-66. The Court stated:
First, we examine the transaction to assess the motivations that would prompt
a reasonable seller and buyer to enter into it. If the seller's purpose is to raise
money for the general use of a business enterprise or to finance substantial
investments and the buyer is interested primarily in the profit the note is ex-
pected to generate, the instrument is likely to be a "security." If the note is
exchanged to facilitate the purchase and sale of a minor asset or consumer
good, to correct for the seller's cash-flow difficulties, or to advance some other
commercial or consumer purpose, on the other hand, the note is less sensibly
described as a "security."
Id. at 67.
57. Specifically, the Court stated, "Second, we examine the 'plan of distribu-
tion'... to determine whether it is an instrument in which there is 'common trading'
for speculation or investment." Id.
58. Id. The Court stated: "Third, we examine the reasonable expectations of the
investing public: The Court will consider instruments to be 'securities' on the basis of
such public expectations, even where an economic analysis of the circumstances of the
particular transaction might suggest that the instruments are not 'securities' as used in
that transaction." Td.
59. Id. The Court finally turned to "whether some factor such as the existence of
another regulatory scheme significantly reduces the risk of the instrument, thereby
rendering application of the Securities Acts unnecessary." Id.
60. Id. at 66.
61. Id. at 67-68. In Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 856 F.2d 52, 54 (8th Cir. 1988),
the Eighth Circuit based its decision on a Landreth Timber analysis, examining the de-
1131
cally excludes, "any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's accept-
ance which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding
nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the
maturity of which is likewise limited."6 2 The respondents had ar-
gued that demand notes had an immediate maturity, and therefore
fell within this exception. 63 The petitioners, on the other hand, ar-
gued that the exception in section 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act was
designed to exclude only high-quality commercial paper.64 Justice
Marshall chose not to adopt either of these two interpretations. In-
stead the Court insisted that it matters not which interpretation is
correct since the notes do not fall within the short-term exception
under either.65
This was the sole issue which divided the court. While there was
unanimous support for the above outlined test, five justices disagreed
with Justice Marshall's analysis of the maturity of the notes.6 6 Jus-
tice Stevens concurred with Justice Marshall that the notes were se-
curities.6 7 However, his conclusion was based on his statutory
interpretation that the short-term maturity exception of section
3(a)(10) excluded high-quality commercial paper only.68
mand notes for the common characteristics of a security. In the opinion of the court,
"[Tihe demand nature of the notes [was] very uncharacteristic of a security." Id. at 54.
Therefore, the only remaining question was whether application of the Howey test
overrode this implication. Id.
62. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1934).
63. Reves, 494 U.S. at 70-72. Respondents relied upon McMahon v. O'Keefe, 213
Ark. 105, 106, 209 S.W.2d 449, 150 (1948), which held, "a note payable on demand is due
immediately."
64. See Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 5-12, Reves v. Ernst and Young, 494 U.S.
56 (1990) (No. 88-1480).
65. Reves, 494 U.S. at 71. The court further explained that demand notes do not
necessarily have a maturity of nine months or less since demand might not be made
for years. Id. at 72-73.
66. Justice Stevens agreed that the demand notes did not fall within the short
term exception set forth in § 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act; however, he reached this conclu-
sion by adopting the petitioners interpretation that the exception applied only to com-
mercial paper. Id. at 76 (Stevens, J., concurring).
In reaching this conclusion, Justice. Stevens relied on two Courts of Appeals cases
which interpreted section 3(a)(10). Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). See, e.g., Sanders v.
John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075, 1079-80 (7th Cir. 1972) (outlining the legislative his-
tory of Section 3(a)(3) of the 1933 Securities Act, which sets forth the four require-
ments for commercial paper exemption from the definition of a security); Zeller v.
Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 472 F.2d 795, 799-800 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908
(1973) (applying the legislative history of Section 3(a)(3) of the 1933 Act to Section
3(a)(10) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.
Justice Rehnquist wrote a separate opinion, joined by Justices White, Scalia, and
O'Connor, arguing that in fact the note was within the exception. Id. at 80-81 (Rehn-
quist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
67. Reves, 494 U.S. at 76 (Stevens, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 74 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens cited to the "unanimous"
interpretation by the courts of appeals that, "when Congress spoke of notes with a ma-
turity not exceeding nine months, it meant commercial paper, not investment securi-
ties." Id. (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075,
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The Chief Justice, joined by Justices White, O'Connor and Scalia
asserted that the notes at issue, based solely on their maturity, were
not securities. 69' The Chief Justice looked to the historically accepted
meanings of the terms "note" and "maturity," insisting that they "did
not spring full-blown from the head of Congress in 1934."70 Buttress-
ing their argument with case law and dictionary definitions from the
1920s and 1930s, the dissenting justices found that "instruments paya-
ble on demand were considered immediately 'due.' "71 Therefore,
under the analysis of Chief Justice Rehnquist, all demand notes
would be included in the short-term exemption of section 3(a)(10) of
the 1934 Act.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE TEST BY THE LOWER COURTS
The deficiency of the test established in Reves is exemplified by the
inconsistency in its application by the lower courts. An examination
of these subsequent decisions reveals that the enumerated factors
have been applied differently in almost every case.72
A. The Second Circuit
Given that the Second Circuit first adopted, and was the sole cir-
cuit using, the family resemblance test prior to Reves,73 one would
expect the courts in this jurisdiction to most consistently apply the
test. However, this has not been the result. While no cases yet have
reached the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the district
courts under this circuit have applied the Reves test in at least eight
1080 (7th Cir. 1972), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1009 (1972)). Furthermore, he noted that the
SEC adopted this interpretation as well. Id. at 75 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Se-
curities Act Release No. 33-4412, 26 Fed. Reg. 9158 (1961)).
69. Id. at 81-82 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
70. Id. at 77 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
71. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The cases dis-
cussed by the dissenting justices analyzed the maturity in order to determine when the
statute of limitations began to run. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). However, Rehnquist insisted that the maturity date which held the
maker liable to his obligation was analogous to the situation in Reves. Id. at 78 (Rehn-
quist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
72. See infra notes 73-218 and accompanying text. This article discusses only
those cases which fully apply the Reves test. Several cases mention the opinion, and
undoubtedly other courts made determinations based on Reves, especially at the pre-
trial stage. However, it is likely that the cases in the former category provide the best
insight into the usefulness of the test.
73. See supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
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cases, almost as many as all of the other federal courts combined.
Vast inconsistencies have developed in the interpretation of Reves.
Singer v. Livoti 74 involved allegations of securities fraud by an at-
torney who had arranged financing for a failed real estate transac-
tion.75 The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim, on the ground that the
short-term note involved was not a security.76 Attorney Livoti alleg-
edly made misrepresentations which induced the plaintiffs, who were
his clients, to make a loan to Frank Nocito, another client of Livoti's,
in connection with a real estate development project.77 The loan was
evidenced by a promissory note carrying interest payable at maturity,
at an annual rate of ten percent.78
In reaching a decision, the court was first faced with interpreting
the short-term exception to section 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act, since the
note had a maturity of six months.79 The court recognized that this
question was unresolved by Reves.80 Therefore, :it relied on Second
Circuit precedent indicating that, like long-term instruments, this
type of non-security, short-term note should be presumed to be a se-
curity.8 1 The court then applied the Reves test to determine whether
the presumption was rebutted. Since the note was secured by a mort-
gage on several homes, the court held that it clearly resembled one of
the enumerated categories.8 2 Thus, it reasoned that the note was not
a security.8 3 However, it still applied the Reves factors.8 4
The court made several observations while applying the Reves fac-
tors. With regard to the motivations of the buyer and seller, the
court noted that "[t]his transaction shows all of the economic context
of a temporary loan to solve cash flow difficulties, not a permanent
74. 741 F.Supp. 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
75. Id. at 1041.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1042. Mr. Singer and his wife loaned money to Frank Nocito. In ex-
change, the Singers received a note, secured by a mortgage on the property in New
York under development by Mr. Nocito. Id.
78. Id. There had been some discussion of giving the Singers an equity interest in
the development; however, only the claim under the note was asserted at trial.
79. Id. at 1046-49.
80. Id. at 1048.
81. Id. at 1049. "On the assumption that Zeller's restrictive interpretation of the
statutory exception for short-term promissory notes [that the exception applies only to
high grade commercial paper] is still good law in this Circuit, the Note and Refinanced
Note initially must be presumed to be 'securities.'" Id. See Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg.
Corp., 476 F.2d 795, 799-800 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973) (pointing
out that under Section 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act, only high grade commercial pa-
per is exempted from the definition of a security).
82. Singer, 741 F.Supp. at 1049. The list includes "the note secured by a mortgage
on a home." Exchange Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d at 1126,
1138 (1976).
83. Id.
84. Singer, 741 F.Supp. at 1049.
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or semi-permanent source of capital investment."8 5 Further, it found
no plan of distribution; rather, it noted that the transaction involved
a one-on-one arm's-length transaction.86 The court also rejected any
public expectation that the note was a security, since "the most that
any purchaser could derive would be the collection of interest at ten
percent for less than a year and the cementing of good will with [the
real estate developer]. 8 7 Finally, the court mentioned the existence
of several risk-reducing factors, including the presence of a profes-
sional intermediary, such as an attorney or broker licensed and regu-
lated by the state, and the state's requirement that all mortgages be
recorded to protect against subsequent encumbrance of the prop-
erty.8 8 These risk-reducing factors point to treating this note as a
commercial loan. The fact that the mortgage was not recorded in this
case was immaterial.8 9 Therefore, the court concluded that this note
was not a security.9°
The Southern District of New York next applied Reves in Mishkin
v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.91 In Mishkin, a Securities Investor
Protection Association (SIPA) trustee appointed for a broker/dealer
in Chapter 7 bankruptcy brought an action against an accounting
firm which had audited the broker/dealer prior to the bankruptcy fil-
ing.92 In addition to negligence claims, the trustee asserted claims of
aiding and abetting a violation of section 10(b). 9 3 The securities
charge involved: 1) alleged sales of non-existent banker's acceptances
with maturities of less than nine months to two banks and two sav-
ings and loans; 2) participations in groups of these banker's accept-
ances; and 3) a non-existent thirty-year treasury note to a third
bank.94 In discussing the status of the participations in the banker's
acceptances, the court propounded that they were not securities
because:
1) Banker's acceptances and participations therein with maturities not ex-
ceeding nine months are themselves exempt from the definition of "secur-
85. Id. at 1050.
86. Id,
87. I
88. 1I See generally N.Y. JUD. LAW § 460 (McKinney 1992 and Supp.).
89. Singer, 741 F. Supp. at 1050. The court failed to note that the mere existence
of the collateral also reduced the lender's risk.
90. Id at 1051.
91. 744 F. Supp. 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
92. Id. at 535.
93. Id, at 551.
94. Id,
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ities" under section 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act.9 5
2) There is no reason to remove this type of short-term commercial lending
transaction from the class of non-securities.9 6
3) [P]urchasers of participations in a banker's acceptance (generally financial
institutions) are looking for a low risk, short-term, fixed interest rate invest-
ment. There is no significant secondary market for such participations; inves-
tors generally have the intention of holding the participations to maturity.
Investments in participations of a banker's acceptance are investments in the
short-term money market.
9 7
The court concluded that because no purchase or sale of a security
was involved in those four counts, it did not have jurisdiction over
those claims.98
In Premier Microwave Corp v. Comtech Telecommunications,99
plaintiff Purnendu Chatterjee formed a corporation to acquire the as-
sets of the Premier Microwave division of Comtech, along with a
warrant entitling him to purchase 500,000 shares of Comtech com-
mon stock at $2 per share for a period of five years.1 0 0 The purchase
price was $7.5 million, which consisted of $6.5 million in cash and a
seven-year note issued by PMCC, the acquisition corporation. 101 The
note was for a principal amount of $1,000,000 with an 8.5 percent an-
nual interest rate.102 In examining the 10(b) claim, the court had to
determine whether the fraud occurred "in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security," necessitating the application of
Reves. 03
After ascertaining that the existence of the warrant did not satisfy
this requirement, the court turned its attention to the note.1 04 In ap-
plying the Reves factors, the court first presumed that the note was a
security. 05 Second, it recognized that the note did not exactly fit any
of the enumerated categories of non-securities. 0 6 Third, it applied
the four Reves factors and concluded the note was not a security
because:
[i]n particular, the second Reves factor, the "plan of distribution" is inapplica-
ble to the Note here. There was no such plan and there was no "common
95. Id at 553. The court found this fact dispositive for those defendants who be-
lieved they were purchasing banker's acceptances, noting that "[b]ecause banker's ac-
ceptances are exempt non-securities under the Exchange Act, this court has no subject
matter jurisdiction over the four claims based on purchases of the banker's accept-
ances." Id.
96. Id. at 553 (citing Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990)).
97. Id. at 554.
98. Id.
99. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,789; No. 88 Civ. 2570 (KMW), 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 846 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 1991).
100. 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at 846.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at *4.
104. Id. at *11-12.
105. Id. at *12.
106. Id.
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trading for speculation or investment." Similarly the third general factor,
public expectation that the note is a security, is inapplicable here. Surely
there was no public expectation that the promissory Note between Premier's
buyer and seller would be traded or speculated in as a security.1 0 7
The court did not even mention the other two factors before con-
cluding that the note was not a security.
In Varnberg v. Minnick,O8 the plaintiffs inherited an investment
portfolio valued at nearly $6 million.109 They invested this money in
various tax shelter limited partnerships organized by the defendant,
Wendall Minnick.10 Between June 1978 and September 1980, the
plaintiffs made forty-eight separate "loans" to the partnership in ex-
change for a note."' In determining whether this note was a secur-
ity, the court referred to Reves, but did not explicitly apply the test.
However, the court did discuss facts which apply to many of the
Reves factors. For example, the court mentioned that the note cov-
ered loans made "for a variety of different business ventures of the
partnership."11 2 This implied that the motivations were commercial
rather than investment in nature. Next, the court seemed to address
the plan of distribution by mentioning a number of facts which indi-
cated an arm's-length transaction.1 1 3 The court found that the in-
vesting public could not have expected the note to be a security as it
had no knowlege to base such an expectation.1 1 4 Finally, it concluded
that "it appears that the note was drafted as a means of recording
open account loans made by Gail Varnberg and for tax purposes."" 5
Consequently, the court only partially based its reasoning on Reves
when it held that the note was not a security.' 1 6
107. Id at 860 (citing Singer v. Livoti, 741 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)).
108. 760 F. Supp. 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
109. Id at 318.
110. Id
111. Id. at 320 n.8.
112. Id at 325.
113. Id The court found that the note "was evidently custom-drafted by [the tax
attorney retained by the plaintiffs]. Although the note was convertible into a 15% in-
terest in BW Partners, [one of the partnerships organized by the defendant], the inter-
est rate was considerably below the rates prevailing in 1978." Id. The court also found
little possibility that the note was offered to any other investor, or that a there was
any intent to create a secondary market. Id.
114. Id. at 325-26. "[The note] was payable on demand from a closely-held partner-
ship which.., had no apparent investment strategy." Id at 326.
115. Id. at 326. The court made this observation to point out the "economic reali-
ties" of the transaction. This appears to be a throwback to the language of pre-Reves
Second Circuit cases. See, e.g., Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930,
942 (2nd Cir. 1984); Exchange Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d
1126, 1138 (2nd Cir. 1984).
116. Varnberg, 760 F. Supp. at 326.
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In Banco Espa~iol de Credito v. Security Pacific National Bank,"17
the plaintiffs purchased, from Security Pacific, participations in
short-term bank loans which Security Pacific had loaned to another
customer.1 18 A Master Participation Agreement (MPA) evidenced
these purchases."l 9 Security Pacific made the short-term loans to In-
tegrated Resource Inc. (Integrated) to facilitate current operations.x20
As such, these underlying loans were clearly not securities. 121 How-
ever, plaintiffs asserted that participations in non-securities may still
be securities.122
The court accepted this reasoning,123 and applied the Reves test.
First, it opined that the instruments bore "a strong family resem-
blance to 'loans by commercial banks [to customers] for current oper-
ations.'"124 The court next applied the Reves factors in order to
determine whether the note should be considered a non-security.
First, it explained that the motivation of Security Pacific was to in-
crease lines of credit to a current customer.125 On the other hand, it
asserted that Integrated was motivated by a need for short-term
funds, while the opportunity to earn greater than market interest
rates motivated the participants.126 Therefore, according to the
court, "the overall motivation of the parties was the promotion of
commercial purposes and not investments in a business enterprise. 27
Secondly, it stated that "[t]he plan of distribution was a limited solici-
tation to sophisticated financial or commercial institutions and not to
the general public."' 2 8 Third, it noted that perceptions of the invest-
ing public depended upon the particular investing public:129 if the in-
vesting public was the general public, there was no perception,
because they had no knowledge of the program's existence; 3 0 if only
117. 763 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
118. Id. at 38.
119. Id,
120. 1&
121. Id. at 41. This note bears a strong resemblance to a short term note secured by
an assignment of accounts receivable, which is a member of the family of non-securi-
ties. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
122. Plaintiffs do not argue for a "Mishkin Analysis," which acknowledges the pos-
sibility that participation in non-securities may be a security, but concludes that tradi-
tional loan participation is not a security. Id. at 42. See Mishkin v. Pean, Marwick,
Mitchell & Co., 744 F.Supp. 531, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). Rather, plaintiffs contend that
"the participations at issue arising in a short-term loan program are wholly different
from traditional loans." Banco Espafiol, 763 F.Supp. at 42.
123. Banco Espa~iol, 763 F.Supp. at 42 (citing Commercial Discount Corp. v. Lincoln
First Commercial Corp., 445 F.Supp. 1236, 1267 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)).
124. Id. at 42 (quoting Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 64 (1990)).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 43.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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the offeree is the investing public then it could be seen "only as loan
participations;131 [a] reasonable sophisticated... institution [as an in-
vesting public] was on notice through the contractual provisions that
the instruments are participations in loans and not investments in
business enterprise."'i3 2 Finally, the court recognized the existence of
another regulatory scheme, specifically guidelines issued by the Of-
fice of the Comptroller regarding the purchase or sale of loan partici-
pations. 3 3 Therefore, it found that this was not a security.
Although all of the loans and the participations had maturity dates
of less than six months, the court did not discuss the short-term ex-
clusion. This was because this case concerned a violation of section
12(2) of the 1933 Act, which does not contain the broad short-term
exemption in its definition of a security.' 3 4
In lacobucci v. Universal Bank of Maryland,135 the plaintiffs had
deposited money in savings accounts to secure credit cards issued to
them. 3 6 The court quickly held that this activity did not involve the
purchase or sale of a security, noting that "[t]he cash management ac-
counts fail on at least two of the Reves factors:"1 37 first, the plaintiffs
were motivated by receipt of the credit cards; secondly, any reason-
able member of the public would perceive the receipt of the credit
cards as the motivation behind the transaction.138 Thus, the court
dismissed the claim.'3 9
One of the most interesting cases examined by the Southern Dis-
trict of New York was National Bank of Yugoslavia v. Drexel Burn-
ham Lambert.140 The Bank of Yugoslavia deposited more than $71
million with Drexel in 1989 and 1990, which Drexel agreed to pay
back with interest within three months.141 While the Bank expected
Drexel to invest the money, the money was actually used to alleviate
131. IdL
132. Id,
133. Id.
134. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1981).
135. Fed. Sec. L,. Rep. (CCH) 96,075; 1991 U.S Dist. LEXIS 7843 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
For a brief analysis of this opinion, see 23 SEC. REG. AND L. REP. 1034 (1991).
136. Id- at *1.
137. Id. at *15-16.
138. Id. at *17. The court did not discuss any other Reves factors. Apparently, they
felt that the two factors alone were dispositive.
139. Id.
140. 768 F. Supp. 1010 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
141. Id. at 1012. Drexel accepted 70 million deutsche marks followed by an addi-
tional 40 million dollars. Id.
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Drexel's cash flow problems.' 42 In February of 1990, Drexel in-
formed the Bank that due to its financial problems, it would be un-
able to return approximately $71 million.'43  Shortly thereafter,
Drexel sought protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code.'44 The Bank filed suit in the Southern District of New York,
claiming that Drexel violated numerous securities laws.145 Drexel
moved for dismissal based on the Bank's failure to state a claim and
the lack of subject matter jurisdiction.146 To rule on these motions,
the court had to determine whether the note given by Drexel to the
Bank was a "security.' ' 47 In applying Reves, the court first examined
the effect of the short-term exemption. The defendants argued that
under Second Circuit precedent, short-term notes are presumed not
to be securities.1 48 The court responded that "[t]he Supreme Court
interpreted the law of this circuit differently, stating that in the Sec-
ond Circuit, '[n]o presumption of any kind [is] attached to notes of
less than nine months' duration.' "149 The court also rejected
Drexel's next argument that the time deposits closely resembled
" 'notes evidencing loans by commercial banks for current opera-
tions.' "150 Therefore, the court used the Reves factors to determine
whether this instrument should be added to the list.
The court examined:
1) The motivations of the buyer and seller. For purposes of a mo-
tion to dismiss, the court intially found that the motivations alleged
by the complainant must be accepted as true.1 5 ' The Bank asserted
that the transaction was motivated by a desire to profit from Drexel's
investment. 5 2 Drexel naturally claimed that the transaction was a
loan to cover general business expenses.' 53 Thus this case raised, but
142. Id. at 1012-13.
143. Id. at 1013.
144. See Kurt Eichenwald, The Drexel Collapse: For Drexel, Creditors Galore, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 15, 1990, at D1. Drexel made its bankruptcy filing at 11:07 p.m. on Febru-
ary 13, 1990. Id. The filing was precipitated by a "rapid cash squeeze because of a
shortage of short-term financing." Id.
145. Bank of Yugoslavia, 768 F. Supp. at 1012.
146. Id. The court found the FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) motion without merit since,
"there is no contention that the Bank's securities laws claims are frivolous and inter-
posed to manufacture jurisdiction ...." Id. at 1012 n.1. See generally FED. R. CIv. P.
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).
147. Bank of Yugoslavia, 768 F.Supp. at 1014.
148. Id. at 1014 n.3 (citing Varnberg v. Minnick, 760 F. Supp. 315, 325 (S.D.N.Y.
1991)).
149. Id. (quoting Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 65 n.3).
150. Id. at 1014 (quoting Reves, 494 U.S. at 65). The court distinguished this trans-
action because "[t]he Bank is not a commercial lending institution, but the central
bank of a sovereign state." Id. It also explained that the transaction did not involve
the normal formalities involved in a commercial loan transaction. Id.
151. Id. at 1013.
152. Id. at 1015.
153. Id. at 1013, 1015.
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did not decide, whose motivations should control in situations regard-
ing this jurisdictional issue.lM
2) The plan of distribution. The court next recognized there was
no widespread plan of distribution, but opined that "the absence of
such an allegation is not fatal to the Bank's securities laws claims."155
If this factor could negate the existence of a security, the court be-
lieved that the purpose of the securities laws would be
undermined.lN
3) The reasonable expectations of the investing public. The court
claimed that since the public was unaware of the transaction, it
would be too speculative to determine the public's expectations.157
The court rejected Drexel's argument that the one-on-one transac-
tion would lead the investing public to expect that no security is
involved.158
4) The presence of other risk-reducing factors. Finally, the court
concluded that while the short maturity of the notes should be con-
sidered, this alone does not satisfy this factor.159 It noted that the
common law and federal bankruptcy law offered the only protection
for the Bank.160 Since both of these existed prior to enactment of
the securities laws, the court reasoned that the latter would not have
been enacted had the former afforded adequate protection to the
investor.161
Finally, the court examined the short maturity of the notes, and
concluded that the exemption in Section 3(a)(10) applies only to com-
mercial paper.162
B. The Third Circuit
In Fulton Bank v. McKittrick & Briggs Securities,163 Fulton Bank
purchased participations in lease payments to be made under a Lease
Payment and Services Agreement (LPSA) between McKittrick's sub-
sidiary, Impact Management Systems, and York County Penn. 64
154. Id. at 1015.
155. Id.
156. Id at, 1016.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Nos. 88-0144 & 88-0882, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11371 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 1990).
164. Id. at *2-3.
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McKittrick marketed the participations through Kidder Peabody, by
representing to the plaintiff that the resulting interest earned would
be tax-free.16 5
In order to establish its subject matter jurisdiction, the court first
examined whether the participations were securities. 166 Therefore,
the court applied the Reves test, finding that:
1) the seller was motivated by its need to raise money for general
use to meet obligations under the LPSA, and the buyer was moti-
vated by profit and tax benefits;167
2) there was no trading in this instrument, noting that it was
"nonetheless distributed by one registered broker/dealer to another
registered broker/dealer, and was ultimately resold to a sophisticated
investor as an investment;"'168
3) since this was a common investment at the time, the public
would reasonably expect this instrument to be a security;169
4) no other regulations governed this type of transaction.170
Therefore, the court deemed the participations to be securities.17'
C. The Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit's only application of Reves occurred in
Zolfaghari v. Sheikholeslami.172 The case involved the First Ameri-
can Mortgage Corporation (FAMCO), a company which allegedly
granted and serviced mortgages, and sold mortgages and interests in
pools of mortgages to investors.173 In reality, FAMCO acted fraudu-
lently, selling numerous notes allegedly secured by the same mort-
gage. 174 The plaintiffs were a group of Iranian immigrants who
believed that they had purchased notes secured by first mortgages. 175
The court explained that "[a] note secured by a mortgage on a single
home is typically not a security because the return on investment
therefrom is not derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial ef-
forts of others."176 Yet, once the mortgages are pooled and interests
in the pool are sold to investors, the court recognized that they could
165. Id. at *4-5.
166. Id. at *9.
167. Id. at *11.
168. Id. at *14.
169. Id. at *15-16 (citing Trends in Municipal Leasing: Tax-exempt Leases Spread
in Popularity, WALL ST. J., May 4, 1988, at 25).
170. Id. at *16.
171. Id.
172. 943 F.2d 451 (4th Cir. 1991).
173. Id. at 453.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 453-54.
176. Id. at 455 (citing Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 65 (1990). This is an
interesting interpretation of why the items on the family resemblance list are not se-
curities, in that it sounds more like the Howey test than the Reves test.
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be classified as securities. 77 Because there was evidence that the
plaintiffs purchased such participations, the court held that summary
judgment on the securities claim was premature.i7 8 Thus, while the
court mentioned Reves, it applied none of the Supreme Court's analy-
sis in reaching its conclusion.179
D. The Fifth Circuit
Reeder v. Palmer'8 0 examined a scheme whereby the plaintiffs "in-
vested" in a program to sell travel junkets which turned out to be fic-
titious.18 1 In return for providing customers for the junkets, the
plaintiffs were given post-dated checks.18 2 To resolve the 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss, the court questioned whether these checks were
securities. 8 3 Because the checks are payable on demand, the court
determined that they were excluded under the short-term exemp-
tion. 8 4 Nonetheless, like other courts, the court still applied the
Reves factors, even though the instruments technically were not
notes.18 5 The first factor failed under the court's analysis, because
the investors could have no expectation of profit, given the fixed rate
of interest and the use of the money for the general needs of the
"business."186 The court asserted that the second factor failed be-
cause there was no "plan of distribution" or secondary trading mar-
ket.187 It found no need to examine the third prong since the public
177. Id. In support of this assertion, the court chose not to apply the Reves factors;
instead, it analogized to the "mortgage-backed securities" sold by Government Na-
tional Mortgage Association, pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1719(d) (1988).
178. Id. at 456.
179. Id. at 455-56.
180. 736 F.Supp. 128 (E.D.La. 1990), affd per curiam, 917 F.2d 560 (5th Cir. 1990).
181. Id. at 129. Reeder alleged that the travel club he invested in was really a
"Ponzi" scheme. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. The court noted that the case must involve a security in order to state a
claim under both federal and Louisiana securities laws, and that, "instruments which
are not 'securities' under federal law are not securities under Louisiana Law." Id. (cit-
ing Rogillio v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 448 So.2d 1340, 1346 (La.
App. 1984)).
184. Id. at 130 (relying on the definition of "check" and the 1933 and 1934 Acts).
185. Id. at 131. "Although this case does not involve notes, the Court must recog-
nize the Supreme Court's recent decision in Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56
(1990)." Id.
186. Id. at 131. This is a much more narrow definition of profit expectation than
that apparently applied by the Supreme Court in Reves. The notes in Reves also paid a
fixed rate of interest, and yet the court found a profit motive on the part of the lend-
ers/investors. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 68.
187. Id. at 131.
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could have no expectation about something it never saw.188 Finally,
as to other risk-reducing factors, the court announced, "Although the
fraud perpetrated by Martin is not covered by any regulatory scheme,
the holder of a worthless check has a right-albeit a hollow one in
this case-under Louisiana law to pursue an action against the is-
suer."18 9 Hence, the mere presence of a common law remedy is
deemed sufficient to satisfy this prong. The court then rejected the
checks as investment contracts under Howey, and therefore found
them not to be securities.190
In Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace'9 the court faced the same facts
with different plaintiffs. However, the court in Guidry was less cau-
tious, and dismissed any application of Reves.1 92
E. The Sixth Circuit
Mercer v. Jaffe, Snider, Raitt and Heuer, P.C193 was decided just
two months after Reves, yet the opinion includes a suprisingly in-
depth application of the test. The case grew out of the actions of an
interrelated group of bankrupt corporations which had previously
marketed mortgages. 9 4 The remaining defendants were those indi-
viduals who allegedly aided and abetted those corporations in com-
mitting common law fraud and violations of Section 10(b) of the 1934
Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.195 The defendants
moved for summary judgment on the 10b-5 claim on the grounds that
neither the notes nor the CML shares were securities.196
The first mortgage notes were analyzed under Reves. The court
recognized that "the notes secured by a mortgage on a home" are on
188. Id. This is a common yet seemingly unintended interpretation of this prong of
the Reves test, whereby courts have held that if there was no widespread distribution,
the third factor is moot because the public had no expectations.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 131-32. Its application of all possible tests greatly reduces the court's
chances of being overturned, and was probably the primary motivator for their
application.
191. 740 F. Supp. 1208 (E.D.La. 1990) affd as modified, 954 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1992).
192. Id. at 1214-15.
193. 736 F.Supp. 764 (W.D. Mich. 1990) (affd per curiam, 933 F.2d 1008 (1991)).
194. Id. at 766. The plaintiff corporation, A.J. Obie & Associates, Inc. ("Obie"), was
a registered broker/dealer which sold both individual mortgage backed promissory
notes marketed by Diamond Mortgage Corp. ("Diamond"), and shares in a real estate
investment trust, Commerce Mortgage Investments, Ltd., ("CMI"), which held mort-
gage notes marketed by Diamond. Id.
195. Id. The defendants were: 1) Attorney Ronald M. Barron, and his law firm
Ronald M. Barron & Associates, P.C.; 2) James Karpen, former Director of Enforce-
ment of the Michigan Corporations and Securities Bureau; and 3) Frederick Hoffecker,
Assistant in Charge of the Michigan Attorney General's Consumer Protection Divi-
sion. Id.
196. Id. at 768. The CML shares were quickly deemed to be securities under the
Landreth Timber common characteristics test. Id. For a discussion of Landreth Tim-
ber, see supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
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the list of "non-securities" adopted in Reves.1 97 However, the court
insisted that this list was "not graven in stone" and could be ex-
panded or interpreted.19 8 The court proceeded to expand and inter-
pret the list, finding that these particular "notes secured by the
mortgage on a home" were securities because they had been sold in a
secondary market, thus changing the nature of the instrument. 99 In
other words, mortgage-backed notes become securities once they are
sold in the secondary market.200 The court then applied the four fac-
tors enunciated in Reves to support this interpretation and specifi-
cally ascertained that:
1) the buyer's motivation was profit, and the seller intended to
"finance investment, chiefly the purchase of additional
mortgages";201
2) the notes were widely traded for "speculation and
investment"; 202
3) the public would reasonably conclude the notes were securities,
since the offering circular states that "[t]he First Mortgage Notes are
deemed to be 'securities' as defined by state and federal securities
laws and their offering and sale to the public is subject to the... an-
tifraud provisions of state and federal securities laws";203
4) while the collateralization of the notes is a risk-reducing factor,
there was no such risk reduction since the collateralization was
fraudulent.204
The court concluded that there was no reason to reconsider its con-
clusion that these notes are securities. 205
The only other Sixth Circuit case is In Re Southern Industrial
Banking Corp..208 It arose from the efforts of a trustee in Bank-
197. Id. at 769. (citing, Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 65 (1990); Exchange
Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1138 (2d Cir. 1976)).
198. Id. at 769 (citing, Reves, 494 U.S. at 65).
199. Id The court reasoned that the "[n]otes secured by the mortgage on a home"
category on the list, referred only to such notes evidencing an individually bargained-
for transaction. Id. Under those circumstances the parties involved are generally a
consumer lender and a borrower, rather than "an individual investor and a broker/
dealer selling the notes on a mass market basis." Id. (citing Stone v. Mehlberg, 728 F.
Supp. 1341, 1344-45 (W.D.Mich. 1990)).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 770 (citing Reves, 494 U.S. at 65).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 769.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. 126 B.R. 294 (E.D. Tenn. 1991).
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ruptcy of Southern Industrial Banking Corp. (SIBC) to recover an al-
leged fraudulent conveyance to the law firm of Kennerly,
Montgomery, Howard & Finley (KMH & F).207 Mr. C.H. Butcher,
CEO of SIBC and owner of numerous Tennessee banks, entered into
a transaction to purchase two Florida savings and loans in 1982.208
KMH & F acted as an escrow agent in a transaction involving the de-
posit of $10.4 million of SIBC money into an escrow account.2 09 In
return, SIBC received notes from Butcher, which the bankruptcy
court found to be worthless.210 The court declined to apply the Reves
test, concluding that no more damages could be recovered under the
securities laws than those already due under bankruptcy.211 There-
fore, it saw no reason to disturb the earlier dismissal of this claim.212
F The Seventh Circuit
The Northern District Court of Illinois needed only a footnote to
apply the test in its first post-Reves examination in Rayman v. Peo-
ples Savings Corp.2 13 The court evaluated whether a note issued by
Peoples Savings Corporation, in connection with an attempt to ac-
quire the shares of Crest Savings, was a security.2 14 The note was a
"demand note" which was the same note addressed in Reves.215 It
then applied the Reves test, finding that "the notes in this case do not
qualify as securities where (1) Rayman's purpose in accepting the
notes was not for investment but to finance temporarily a deal that
had originally been planned as all cash, (2) the notes are not traded
for investment or speculation[,] and (3) the notes are all held by one
party."216
Korpai v. Individuals Financial Group, the second case decided by
the Northern District of Illinois, only seven days after Rayman, dis-
missed Reves in an equally perfunctory manner.217 There the plain-
tiff purchased demand promissory notes issued by the defendant. 2 18
207. Id at 296.
208. Id. at 297.
209. Id at 298.
210. Id,
211. Id. at 303.
212. Id. at 304.
213. 735 F.Supp. 842, 845 n.9 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
214. Id. at 843-44.
215. Id. at 845 n.9. The court failed to mention that the demand nature of the notes
was also the issue which split the court in Reves and which was not decided by a clear
majority. They also completely failed to address the application of the short-term ex-
emption to these notes.
216. Id. Interestingly, the court did not mention the fourth Reves factor, the pres-
ence of risk reducing factors, even though the transaction involved two institutions
heavily regulated by the FSLIC.
217. No. 88 c 9401, 1990 WL 51186 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 1990).
218. Id. at *1.
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Since the case was heard so soon after Reves, the court did not be-
lieve it could apply the test properly.219 Thus, it merely assumed the
notes satisfied the test and were therefore securities.2 20
G. The Ninth Circuit
The first Ninth Circuit case decided after Reves to truly apply the
test was First Citizens Federal Savings & Loan Association v.
Worthen Bank & Trust Co.221 In that case, twenty savings and loan
institutions entered into a loan participation agreement to fund a real
estate development project.222 The question before the court was
whether the agreement was a security under the Arizona Blue Sky
Statute.223 It found that the underlying loan to a real estate devel-
oper to finance his project qualified as "a note evidencing a loan
made by a commercial bank to finance current operations of a bor-
rower," one of the items on the list of non-securities. 224 Thus, the
court concluded that it fell "squarely into the.., exception and [did]
not constitute a 'security.' "225 Further, it claimed that the participa-
tion agreement itself was not a security since it could only qualify as
such under the Howey investment contract test, which it subse-
quently failed.226 The most recent Ninth Circuit case to apply Reves
was SEC v. R. G. Reynolds Enterprises.22 7 The case involved an in-
vestment program called a "Managed Account" which was run by the
defendant, R.G. Reynolds.228 The defendant "borrowed" funds from
clients for an orginal six-month term at variable interest rates.229
When these loans became due, Reynolds began issuing promissory
notes to the investors at a rate of twenty to twenty-five percent, to be
219. Id at *2.
220. Id. In doing so, it gave the benefit of the doubt to the party opposing the mo-
tion for summary judgment. Id.
221. 919 F.2d 510 (9th Cir. 1990).
222. 1& at 512.
223. Id. at 515 n.4. See also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1801 (1987) (which con-
tained a definition similar to that under the 1934 Act). Arizona courts had interpreted
the law based upon federal analysis. First Citizens, 919 F.2d at 515 n.4.
224. First Citizens, 919 F.2d at 515 (citing Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen &
Co., 726 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1984)).
225. Id. at 515-16.
226. Id. at 516. Consequently, the summary judgment against the plaintiffs' securi-
ties fraud claim was upheld. Id.
227. 952 F.2d 1125 (9th Cir. 1991).
228. Id. at 1128. The account was actually referred to by a number of names, in-
cluding "discretionary account," "30% Net Investment Program," and "Loan Pro-
gram." Id.
229. Id
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paid at a specified date, usually six to twelve months in the future.23 0
The SEC brought an action against Mr. Reynolds, alleging that he vi-
olated both antifraud provisions.23 ' Reynolds argued that the invest-
ments at issue were not securities. 23 2 The court applied the Reves
factors to the promissory notes and determined that they were secur-
ities because:
1) Reynolds allegedly raised money to finance a substantial invest-
ment, and the investors looked solely to profit in the form of
interest;233
2) "[t]he notes were 'offered and sold to a broad segment of the
public' which suggests that the notes are securities";23 4
3) [t]he public could reasonably infer that the notes were securi-
ties, based upon letters from Reynolds which characterized them as
investments;23 5
4) there were no risk-reducing factors.23 6
The court next questioned the effect of the short-term nature of
some of the notes.23 7 Since Reves had left this question open, the
court focused on other circuit opinions.238 In particular, it cited nu-
merous cases which limited the short-term exceptions under both
acts 239 to apply only to commercial paper,240 stating, "We agree with
230. Id.
231. Id. at 1129. The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
both contain "anti-fraud" provisions. While the provisions are similar, the courts have
found an implied private right of action under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b) (West 1981), but have not found a similar right under § 17(a) of the 1933 Act,
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (West 1981). Therefore, only the SEC may bring an action under
§ 17(a), which has led to a smaller body of law interpreting the definition of a security
under the 1933 Act.
232. Id. As such, he argued that the summary judgment granted for the SEC was
improper. Id. The court found that two distinct interests needed to be examined: "(1)
the somewhat ill-defined interest initially offered, in which investors gave Reynolds
cash in return for his promise of a high rate of return; and (2) promissory notes issued
to ivestors who had already entered the program." Id. at 1130. The court applied the
Howey test to the first category and found that the interests were in fact investment
contracts, and hence securities. Id. at 1130-31.
233. Id. at 1131.
234. Id. (quoting Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 65 (1990)).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 1132.
239. Section 3(a)(3) of the 1933 Act provides a similar short term exemption, except
that it is more clearly limited to commercial paper instruments. This section exempts:
Any note, draft, bill of exchange, or bankers' acceptance which arises out of a
current transaction or the proceeds of which have been or are to be used for
current transactions, and which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not
exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace or any renewal thereof ....
240. R.G. Reynolds, 952 F.2d at 1132 (citing Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476
F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973); Holloway v. Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell & Co., 900 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir 1989), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 386 (1990); Baurer
v. Planning Group, Inc., 669 F.2d 770 (D.C. Cir. 1981); McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497
1148
[Vol. 19: 1123, 1992] Reves Revisited
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
these circuits that logic and legislative history favor limiting the
short-term note exception to commercial paper and hold that the
presumption that a note is a security applies equally to notes of less
than nine months' maturity that are not commercial paper." 24 1 This
interpretation rendered the different terms of the notes irrelevant to
the court's earlier conclusion that the notes were securities.
H. The Tenth Circuit
One of the most interesting post-Reves decisions is the remanded
decision of Holloway v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.,242 This case
had already been decided under the Commercial/Investment Dichot-
omy test in Holloway .243 Given the facts, it is rather remarkable
that the court concluded that the securities laws applied, under
either test. The instruments involved were "thrift certificates" and
"passbook savings certificates" issued by Republic Bancorporation,
Inc. and its subsidiaries, Republic Trust & Savings (RTC), a trust
company, and Republic Financial Corporation (RFC), a finance com-
pany.244 The court first determined that these certificates were es-
sentially debt instruments, and therefore should be analyzed using
the test for "notes."245 In Holloway I, the court focused on specific
factors of the commercial investment dichotomy test which it felt
were "particularly important in this case." 246 This focus revealed
that:
(1) RTS and RFC solicited the general public for investments in their ...
certificates.2 4 7
(2) The instruments were issued as a vehicle for raising capital which was ap-
parently used as general financing for RTS and RFC, and which involved the
F.2d 490, (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975); Sanders v. John Nuveen &
Co., 463 F.2d 1075 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009 (1972)).
241. Id.
242. 900 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1990) (hereinafter Holloway II); This case was the re-
sult of the remand of Holloway v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 879 F.2d 772 (10th
Cir 1989) ("Holloway I") by the U.S. Supreme Court with orders to be reheard in ac-
cordance with Reves. See Holloway v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 110 S. Ct. 1314
(1989) (vacating judgment and remanding for rehearing in accordance with Reves).
243. 879 F.2d 772 (10th Cir. 1991); see also, 22 SEC. REG. AND L. REP. 1567 (1990).
244. Holloway 1, 879 F.2d at 774-75.
245. Id. at 777. The court described the certificates as, "representing a promise by
the issuing entity to repay the principal amount, plus accrued interest at a specified
rate, within a specified time period or on demand." Id.
246. Id. at 779.
247. Id. The court found the public solicitation to be nearly determinative since a
crucial purpose of the securities laws was to protect the generally uninformed public
from investment fraud. Id. at 780.
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risk of total loss for the investors.2 48
(3) The record shows that at least some of the offering materials used to in-
duce purchases of instruments issued by RTS and RFC referred to the contri-
butions . . . as "investments," expressly disclaiming that they were
"deposits."2 4 9
Therefore, by discussing three factors from the Commercial/In-
vestment Dichotomy test, which parallel the first three factors of the
Reves test, the court held that the certificates were securities. 25 0 In
reaching this conclusion, the court mentioned but dismissed the im-
portance of two key facts: 1) the demand nature of the certificates,
and 2) the federal regulations of savings and loans.251 Addressing the
demand nature of the notes, the court stated that "the maturity of a
note does not determine its commercial or investment character."25 2
Because the regulation of the entities provided insufficient protection
of investors, the federal regulatory scheme covering the issuing enti-
ties was deemed not to preclude coverage by the securities laws.253
Because of this unusual application and use of selected factors of
the Commercial/Investment Dichotomy test in Holloway I, the Tenth
Circuit in Holloway II could easily dispose of the case when it was
instructed to apply the Reves test. All of the factors applied by the
court in Holloway I were incorporated into the family resemblance
test in Holloway 11.254 These identical results indicate that the newly
styled family resemblance test suffers from the same defects as the
prior tests which involved factors, in that these factors are
manipulatable. 255
248. Id. at 781.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 788.
251. Id. at 782-83, 785-88.
252. Id. at 783 (citing McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490, 495 (5th Cir. 1974)).
253. Id. at 785-86.
254. See Holloway I, 900 F.2d at 1488 n.1. The court mentioned but dismissed one
factor which was substantially changed by Reves, noting:
The major analytical difference between Reves and Holloway [I] lies in the
treatment of other federal regulatory schemes. Our analysis in Holloway pro-
vided that even if the instrument otherwise qualified as a security under the
"investment versus commercial" test, other federal regulation governing the
transaction might still remove the instrument from the protection of the fed-
eral securities laws. [citation omitted]. Reves alters our original analysis in
that we now view the existence of another regulatory scheme which signifi-
cantly reduces the risk of the instrument as one of four factors used to deter-
mine whether the instrument is or should be categorized as a nonsecurity
[citation omitted]. The change in emphasis does not affect the outcome in this
case.
Id.
255. In its Amicus Brief, the SEC argued for adoption of the family resemblance
test primarily because it had no factors, stating,
In focusing on the statutory language, [the family resemblance test] mirrors
the analysis of this Court applied in Landreth [Timber Co. v. Landreth], 471
U.S. [681,] 685-692 [(1985)], and provides useful guidance and a degree of cer-
tainty regarding the status of particular types of notes under the securities
laws. Indeed, as Judge Friendly has pointed out, the other "note" tests inject
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V. PROBLEMS WITH THE APPLICATION OF REVES
As illustrated above, many inconsistencies have arisen among
lower courts applying the Reves test. However, to appreciate these
differences, each portion of the test must be examined separately.
A. When is a note presumed to be a security?
In Reves, the Supreme Court began its analysis by presuming the
"note" to be a security, then applying the factors only to determine
whether the instrument should be removed from the class of securi-
ties covered by the act.256 This approach was followed by most of
the lower courts using Reves to examine longer term instruments.
However, the applicability of this presumption to notes of maturities
of nine months or less was left open. 25 7 Without a clear holding with
respect to short-term notes, the courts used their own discretion in
deciding whether or not to apply the presumption. 25 8 This issue is
a variety of factors into the analysis "without any instructions as to relative
weights."
See Brief for the United States and The Securities And Exchange Commission as
Amici Curiae at 17-18, Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990) (No. 88-1480) (em-
phasis added).
256. Reves, 494 U.S. at 65. "The test begins with the language of the statute; because
the Securities Acts define 'security' to include 'any note,' we begin with a presumption
that every note s a security." (Footnote omitted).
257. Id. at 65 n.3. Justice Marshall's opinion did not rule on the application of the
statutory exception for "notes with a maturity of nine months or less" on this pre-
sumption. Id. The dissent by Chief Justice Rehnquist insisted that demand notes fall
into this category of exempted securities; however, he did not explain whether a find-
ing of short term status should end the court's inquiry, or merely establish a presump-
tion against coverage which can be rebutted by application of the factors. See id. at 76-
78 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting)).
258. The post-Reves cases examining short-term instruments have been widely di-
vergent on this issue. Singer v. Livoti, 741 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), applied the
presumption because the notes in question did not fit the Second Circuit's established
definition of commercial paper. Id. at 1049. National Bank of Yugoslavia v. Drexel
Burnham Lambert, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 1010 (S.D.N.Y 1991), however, ignored this Sec-
ond Circuit precedent and did not apply a presumption of coverage, or no coverage
under the Act allegedly following a mandate from Reves. Id. at 1013, 1017. Mishkin v.
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 744 F. Supp 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), and Reeder V. Palmer,
736 F.Supp. 128 (E.D. La. 1990), (afffd per curiam, 917 F.2d 560 (5th Cir. 1990), applied
apparently conclusive presumptions against coverage for notes which were clearly akin
to commercial paper, and utilized the Reves factors only to give the moving party the
benefit of any doubt. Varnberg v. Minnick, 760 F.Supp. 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), applied a
rebuttable presumption against coverage. Finally, Banco Espafiol de Credito v. Secur-
ity Pacific Nat'l Bank, 763 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), Rayman v. Peoples Savings
Corp., 735 F. Supp. 842 (N.D. Ill. 1990), and Iacobucci v. Universal Bank of Maryland,
Trust Co., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,075 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) all managed to avoid the
issue entirely.
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the basis for large inconsistencies among the lower court opinions
and will probably require review by the high court in the near future.
Resolution of this issue requires two levels of analysis: 1) determin-
ing which instruments Congress intended to include in its exception,
and 2) whether short-term instruments are presumed not to be secur-
ities, or whether courts should not apply any presumption for or
against coverage under the Act.259
Before deciding which notes should be exempted, it is necessary to
determine what exactly is meant by a maturity of nine months or
less. The plurality in Reves implied that demand notes fell outside
of the exception since they would not necessarily mature within nine
months.260 However, in Varnberg the court accepted as a given that
the demand notes examined fell within the exception, so that the
party asserting Securities Act coverage must show that the context
does not otherwise require. 261 On the other hand, the Southern Dis-
trict of New York, in National Bank of Yugoslavia continued to ap-
ply the Second Circuit interpretation that the exemption from
coverage by the securities acts applies only if high-quality commercial
paper is exempted from coverage by the Securities Acts.262 Any
other short-term instrument is therefore treated like any other note,
and is presumed to be a security.263 This allowed the court to sustain
the dismissal of a summary judgment motion by the defendant
Drexel, Burnham, Lambert, which argued that the Securities Acts
could not apply since the notes were to be paid within three
months.264 Singer v. Livotti took a similar approach.26 5
Many of the courts which applied the presumption in favor of cov-
259. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 65 n.3.
260. Id. at 72-73. The court insisted:
If it is plausible to regard a demand note as having an immediate maturity be-
cause demand could be made immediately, it is also plausible to regard the
maturity of a demand note as being in excess of nine months because demand
could be made many years or decades into the future. Given this ambiguity,
the exclusion must be interpreted in accordance with its purpose.
Id. at 73 (emphasis in original). Then the court held that in view of "Congress' broader
purpose in the acts of ensuring that investments of all descriptions be regulated to pre-
vent fraud and abuse, we interpret the exception not to cover the demand notes at is-
sue here." Id. (emphasis in original).
261. Varnberg, 760 F. Supp. at 325. The court cited to Second Circuit precedent,
most notably Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976)
to support the idea that notes payable on demand fit into the exception. Then it ana-
lyzed the effect of this determination, noting, "A party such as Gail or Robert
Varnberg asserting that a given note with a maturity of less than nine months is
within the 1934 Act has the burden of demonstrating that 'the context otherwise re-
quires.'" Varnberg, 760 F. Supp. at 325 (citing Exchange Nat'l Bank, 544 F.2d at 1137-
38) (emphasis in original)).
262. National Bank of Yugoslavia, 768 F. Supp. at 1017.
263. Id. at 1014.
264. Id.
265. Singer v. Livotti, 741 F.Supp. 1040, 1049 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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erage were hearing cases on appeal from summary dismissals. By ap-
plying the presumption which most favored the moving party and
then refuting that presumption, these courts were governed more by
the Rules of Civil Procedure than by Reves.266 Thus application of
the presumption under those circumstances is not necessarily a sanc-
tion of its application by trial courts.
B. Application of the Factors
In its amicus brief for Reves, the SEC supported adoption of the
family resemblance test because, unlike the alternatives, it did not
require application of "open-ended, multi-factor analyses." 267 Unfor-
tunately, Marshall's test added factors and all of the ambiguity inher-
ent in their application. 268 Much of the inconsistent application of
Reves stems from two basic problems with these factors: 1) the mean-
ing of each factor, and 2) whether an instrument needed to satisfy
each factor or whether the overall balance favoring coverage or non-
coverage was sufficient.
1. What Exactly Do the Factors Mean?
Justice Marshall's factors are ambiguous enough to be given a vari-
ety of interpretations. An examination of each factor illustrates this
variety.
a. The Motivations of Buyer and Seller
The problem with this factor is that it can mean whatever any
court decides it means. The motivations can be determined through
subjective or objective tests.26 9 If a subjective test is used, the mo-
tives of the parties are often at odds with each other.270 The best ex-
266. See e.g., Fulton Bank v. McKittrick & Briggs Securities, Inc., No. 88-0144 and
88-0882 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11371 (E.D. Pa. (appeal from a motion to dismiss, apply-
ing Reves) 1990)).
267. Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission at 8, Reves v. Ernst and
Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990) (No. 88-1480).
268. Reves, 494 U.S. at 64-65. Justice Marshall intended his factors to reduce the
uncertainty of the Second Circuit test. He reasoned that "[it is impossible to make
any meaningful inquiry into whether an instrument bears a 'resemblance' to one of the
instruments identified by the Second Circuit without specifying what it is about those
instruments that makes them non-'securities.'" Id. at 66.
269. There is no indication in the court's opinion how the motivations are to be de-
termined. See id. at 66-67.
270. In National Bank of Yugoslavia v. Drexel, Burnham, Lambert, Inc., 768 F.Supp
1010 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), there was objective evidence of a lack of understanding between
the parties, in addition to the testimony of the parties. Drexel referred to borrowing
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ample of this problem is seen in National Bank of Yugoslavia.271
The plaintiff bank claimed its motivations were clearly investment-
oriented.27 2 However, the defendant Drexel Burnham Lambert re-
sponded that it used the note to solve its cash flow problems,273 a
purpose which Reves labels as characteristic of a non-security. 274
This forces the court to choose between the two theories on a motion
to dismiss. Because a court must presume the truth of the allegations
contained in the complaint when hearing a motion made pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the choice was simple. The
court merely deferred to the Bank's motivations in ascertaining the
intent of the transaction. 275 On summary judgment or at trial, this
determination would be much more difficult. For example, what if
the court found that the seller's motives were truly commercial in
nature and that the buyers were truly investment-oriented, but the
parties failed to properly communicate?
b. The Plan of Distribution
The Reves test requires the court to examine the plan of distribu-
tion to determine whether the note in question is "an instrument in
which there is 'common trading for speculation.' "276 This factor or a
similar factor was contained in all of the tests adopted by the circuits
prior to Reves.277 The securities laws generally emphasize the regula-
tion of instruments sold to a broad segment of the public, unrelated
to the issuer, and therefore without access to pertinent financial in-
money from the bank, while the bank communicated that it would "place" the money
with Drexel. Id at 1012-13.
271. 768 F. Supp 1010 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
272. Id. at 1012.
273. Id. at 1012-13.
274. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 66-67 (1990). "If the note is exhanged to
facilitate the purchase and sale of a minor asset or consumer good, to correct [I the
seller's cash-flow difficulties ... the note is less sensibly described as a security." Id. at
66 (emphasis added).
275. The court's reliance on the allegations of the complaint is crucial. The defense
argued that the notes resemble "notes evidencing loans by commercial banks for cur-
rent operations," and the court refuted this assertion, stating that "[u]nder the allega-
tion in the complaint, the time deposits bear little resemblance to such loans." Nat'
Bank of Yugoslavia, 768 F. Supp. at 1014. This pattern is used to defeat other defense
arguments and support the reversal of the dismissal.
276. Reves, 494 U.S. at 66 (citing SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344
(1943)).
277. The risk capital approach looked generally at the "circumstances of the issu-
ance," which included the extent of distribution. See supra notes 25-27 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of the approach.
The commercial/investment dichotomy test contained two factors which implicated
widely distributed instruments, requiring both "a large number of notes or payees,"
and "a large dollar amount." See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
The Howey test "looked to the managerial efforts of others," which required that
there be other similarly situated buyers. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
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formation.278 This emphasis includes greater regulation for instru-
ments issued to a large number of investors and those which are later
traded.279
The lower courts applying Reves have had less trouble applying
this factor than the others, but some confusion remains. Courts are
not certain how to treat instruments which resemble an item on the
list when issued, but which are later traded in a secondary market.
For example, in Mercer v. Jaffe, Snider, Raitt and Heuer,28 0 the
notes in question were "first mortgage notes" and thus resembled
"the note secured by a mortgage on a home," an item on the list of
"non-securities."281 Nonetheless, the court held that these notes
were securities because once they were sold to a mass market, they
no longer possessed the characteristics which caused them to be
placed on the list originally.28 2 '
A similar conclusion was reached by the court in Banco Espafiol de
Credito v. Security Pacific National Bank283 where the court ex-
amined participations in short-term bank loans sold by Security Pa-
cific. The underlying notes were commercial in nature, yet the court
found it necessary to apply the Reves factors because "a particiption
in a non-security could itself be a security."28 4 On the other hand,
the court in Mishkin v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.285 examined
participations in banker's acceptances, and held that "[b]ecause a par-
ticipation in a banker's acceptance does not have an identity separate
from the banker's acceptance, the participation is not a 'security' for
purposes of the Exchange Act." 2 86
278. The number and nature of offerees are of utmost importance when an issuer
seeks exemption from the registration requirements of § 5 of the 1933 Act. See 15
U.S.C § 77(e) and Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.508 (1990) promulgated
thereunder.
279. Stringent restrictions on resale are placed on securities which are exempt
from registration. See generally J. WILLIAM HICKS, RESALES OF RESTRICTED SECURI-
TIES (1991).
280. 736 F.Supp. 764 (W.D. Mich. 1990).
281. Id. at 769.
282. Id. The court looked at the underlying reasoning for placing these notes, not-
ing language which emphasized the one-on-one negotiation which ususally surrounds
such an instrument, and found such no arm's-length transaction. Id. It then defended
its position by quoting language in Reves, stating, "whether a particular note is a 'se-
curity' may not be entirely clear at the time it is issued." Id (quoting Reves v. Ernst &
Young, 494 U.S. 56, 63 n.2 (1990)).
283. 763 F.Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
284. Id. at 41 (citing Commercial Discount Corp. v. Lincoln First Commercial Corp.,
445 F.Supp. 1263, 1267 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)).
285. 744 F.Supp. 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
286. Id. at 553.
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c. The Reasonable Expectations of the Investing Public
The lower courts have applied this factor inconsistently because it
is unclear what is meant by "investing public."28 7  The court in
Banco Espatiol de Credito recognizes this ambiguity, stating:
Since the Supreme Court has not defined "investing public" in the context of
this Reves factor, it is unclear whether a subset of the general public could
satisfy the definition. As previously noted, the general public was excluded
from purchasing these instruments and were not targeted with promotional
information. There is no indication that the general public was even aware of
the existence of this program.
2 8 8
There are three basic ways to interpret Justice Marshall's factor.
First, courts can apply an objective theoretical approach, looking to
the reasonable expectations of the average reasonable investor. 28 9
Second, the court may look to the objectively reasonable expectations
of the particular segment of the investing public which made up the
offerees.290 Finally, the court may view this as an extension of the
plan of distribution leg of the test. As such, the factor can be applied
only if the instrument was actually. offered to "the investing pub-
lic."' 2 9 1 Under this last approach, the reasonable expectation prong is
inapplicable to a one-on-one transaction.
d. The Presence of Risk-reducing Factors
The final factor in Justice Marshall's test requires courts to deter-
mine "whether some factor such as the existence of another regula-
tory scheme significantly reduces the risk of the instrument, thereby
rendering application of the Securities Acts unnecessary."292 How-
ever, this mandate contains many ambiguities, namely, whether the
regulatory scheme must be federal or state regulations, and whether
287. Justice Marshall's opinion gives very little guidance. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 66-
67.
288. Banco Espafiol de Credito v. Security Pacific Nat'l Bank, 763 F. Supp 36, 43
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
289. See Varnberg v. Minnick, 760 F.Supp. 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Iacobucci v. Univer-
sal Bank of Maryland, No. 90 Civ. 2719 (JFK) 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7843 (S.D.N.Y.
June 4, 1991); National Bank of Yugoslavia v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 768
F.Supp. 1010 (W.D.N.Y. 1991).
290. See Banco Espafiol de Credito, 763 F. Supp. at 43; Mercer v. Jaffe, Snider, Raitt
and Heuer, 736 F. Supp. 764 (W.D. Mich. 1990); Fulton Bank v. McKittrick & Briggs
Secs., Inc., No. 88-0144, 88-0882 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11371 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 1990);
Holloway v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 900 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1990); Securities
Exchange Comm'n v. R.G. Reynolds Enters., 952 F.2d 1125 (9th Cir. 1991). Of these
only Banco Espa~iol involved sales to only a small segment of the public. The other
cases seemed willing to look at the particular offerees because the instrument was of-
fered to "the investing public."
291. See Reeder v. Palmer, 736 F.Supp. 128 (E.D. La. 1990), offd per curiam 917
F.2d 560 (5th Cir. 1990); Singer v. Livoti, 741 F.Supp. 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Premier
Microwave Corp. v. Comtech Telecommunications Corp., No. 88 Civ. 2570 (KMW) 1991
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 846 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 1991).
292. Reves, 494 U.S. at 67 (citing Marine Bank-v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 557-59
(1982). For a discussion of Marine Bank, see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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other aspects of a transaction could sufficiently reduce the risk. Be-
cause Justice Marshall's opinion cited to Marine Bank v. Weaver,293
courts have sought guidance from the language in that opinion. The
portions of Weaver cited in the majority opinion refer exclusively to
federal regulations. 29 4 Weaver fails to mention other risk-reducing
factors such as state regulation, underlying collateral, or the exist-
ence of common law or state law remedies. However, some courts
could extend the analysis to include regulation by state Blue Sky
laws or even common law fraud.
2. How Should the Factors Be Applied?
The second problem with the Reves factors stems from their appli-
cation. Reves provides no indication whether these factors should be
balanced, as were the factors in the Commercial/Investment Dichot-
omy test, or whether each factor must be satisfied in order to rebut
the presumption of coverage under the Act.295 Most courts seem to
have adopted a balancing approach.296 On the other hand, some
courts have only discussed a few of the factors which they found dis-
positive. Of these, several held that the strong presence of a few fac-
tors was enough to rebut the presumption.297 Other lower courts
took a more stringent approach, holding that the absence of even one
factor could not rebut the presumption of coverage. 298
293. 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
294. In Weaver the question before the court was whether Certificates of Deposit
issued by federally insured and regulated banks were securities. I at 552. The court
held that the presence of these regulations negated the need for coverage under the
Securities Acts. Id. at 559-60. In support of this conclusion, the Weaver court quoted
language from Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979) which stated that ERISA cov-
erage had the same effect. Id. at 558 n.7.
295. Compare Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 856 F.2d 52, 54-55 (8th Cir. 1988),
rev'd sub nom, Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990) and Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507
F.2d 546, 551-52 (10th Cir. 1974).
296. See, e.g., Reeder v. Palmer, 736 F.Supp. 128 (E.D. La. 1990), affd per curiam,
917 F.2d 560 (5th Cir. 1990); Singer v. Livoti, 741 F.Supp. 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Banco
Espafiol De Credito v. Security Pacific Nat'l Bank, 763 F. Supp. 36, 43 (S.D.N.Y. 1991);
Mercer v. Jaffe, Snider, Raitt and Heuer, 736 F. Supp. 764 (W.D. Mich. 1990); Holloway
v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 900 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1990); Securities Exchange
Comm'n v. R.G. Reynolds Enters., 952 F.2d 1125 (9th Cir. 1991); Varnberg v. Minnick,
760 F.Supp. 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); National Bank of Yugoslavia v. Drexel Burnham
Lambert, Inc., 768 F.Supp. 1010 (W.D.N.Y. 1991).
297. Premier Microwave Corp. v. Comtech Telecommunications Corp., No. 88 Civ.
2570 (KMW), 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 846 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 1991); Rayman v. Peoples
Savings Corp., 735 F. Supp. 842 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
298. Iacobucci v. Universal Bank of Maryland, No. 90 Civ. 2719 (JFK), 1991 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7843 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 1991).
1157
VI. PROPOSED CLARIFICATION OF THE TEST
It is crucial to orderly commerce that more certainty exist as to
what instruments are and are not securities. 299 After examining
these problems, the following clarification and interpretation of Jus-
tice Marshall's test is proposed. The proposed test merely refines and
explains the Reves test, taking into account legislative history, case
history, and the ever-popular economic reality.
A. Only Long-Term Notes Are Presumed to Be Securities
The first aspect of the test which must be clarified is when to apply
a presumption of coverage by the Securities Acts. A note with an ini-
tial term of greater than nine months is presumed to be a security.300
If a note has a shorter maturity, including demand notes, no pre-
sumption applies, unless it is found to be high-grade commercial pa-
per.301  Furthermore, a rebuttable presumption exists against
applying the securities laws to all commercial paper.3 0 2 With respect
to other short-term notes, no presumption applies, but the burden of
proof is on the plaintiff to show that the note is a security.303 If a
long-term "note" clearly fits one of the categories on the list, the pre-
sumption shifts to non-security.3 0 4 All of these presumptions are re-
299. See Harlan S. Abrahams, Commercial Notes and Definition of a Security
Under Securities Exchange Act of 1934: A Note Is a Note Is a Note?, 52 NEB. L. REV.
478, 481 (1973).
300. This rule is clearly mandated by Reves, 494 U.S. at 64 n.3 (which questions
only the application of the presumption for notes with a maturity of nine months or
less).
301. Although Justice Stevens was the only Justice to adopt this approach in Reves,
there is ample support from other sources, most notably, the SEC, in Securities Act
Rel. No. 4412, 26 Fed. Reg. 9158, 59 (1961), prior Second Circuit cases, and prior
Supreme Court precedent. See Securities Industry Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, 468 U.S. 137, 150-52 (1984). Petitioners Reply Brief insists
that any other interpretation of this section is radical. Reply Brief for the Petitioner,
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990) (No. 88-1480). It noted that the four-word
phrase preceding the exemption includes "notes, drafts, bills of exchange, or banker's
acceptances" which are all "instruments used to evidence commercial paper." Id.
302. Commercial paper instruments are not the kind of instruments which the se-
curities laws were intended to regulate. First, these notes generally evidence transac-
tions between sophisticated financial institutions. Second, both federal regulation of
those institutions, and the Uniform Commercial Code provide sufficient protection for
purchasers of these instruments. Finally, because the notes are short-term, the risk of
loss is greatly reduced.
303. This assignment of the burden of proof merely follows the accepted principle
that the plaintiff always bears the burden of proof on jurisdictional issues. See, e.g,,
Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a).
304. By shifting the presumption rather than allowing resemblance to an item on
the list to be conclusive proof of non-security status, as the Court proposed in Reves,
494 U.S. at 67, lower courts will more easily analyze notes whose character changes
after issuance. Specifically, holding that mortgage backed notes which are traded in a
secondary market are securities will require less strain. See Mercer v. Jaffe; Snider,
Raitt and Heur, 736 F. Supp. 764 (W.D. Mich. 1990), affd sub nom; Schreimer v.
Greenburg, 931 F.2d 893 (6th Cir. 1991).
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buttable by showing a resemblance or a lack of resemblance to a
member of the family, through application of the factors.30 5
If the "note" is not on the list, then, in order to remove the pre-
sumption of coverage by the Acts, the plaintiff must demonstrate
that all four factors are present.3 06 On the other hand, to transform
a non-security family member into a security there are two key fac-
tors: 1) the plan of distribution, and 2) the absence of any alternative
risk-reducing factors. These factors reflect the concerns that unregu-
lated and widely distributed invesment instruments will be
purchased by an unsuspecting public, a concern at the heart of the
creation and continued importance of the federal Securities Acts. If
the public is not involved or if another federal regulating body ade-
quately protects the public's interests, there is no need to apply the
securities laws. Hence, the remaining factors of the Reves test be-
come incidental.
B. Application of the Factors
1. Motivations of Buyer and Seller
The goal of this factor is to distinguish investors from lenders. The
former are passive; the latter are active. The seller's motivation is
immaterial-only the buyer's motivation should be at issue.307 This
is because securities laws seek to protect the buyer or investor, and
not the seller.308 However, determining the buyer's motivation re-
305. Unless a note is clearly a member of the family, the courts should look to the
factors, either to determine the resemblance to a member, or to ascertain that the note
has the same non-security characteristics as the members of the family. This is consis-
tent with Justice Marshall's reasoning in outlining the factors. See Reves, 494 U.S. at
65-66.
306. This follows the general preference of the courts to be overinclusive rather
than underinclusive when determining which instruments are covered by the Acts.
307. This alteration of the first factor reflects the changing financial markets. At
one time corporations generally borrowed from banks to meet some financial needs
and met other needs by turning to the public. With the advent of junk bond-financed
LBOs, however, the lines between public and private financing have blurred.
308. The legislative history of both acts indicates concern primarily for the inves-
tor. S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933) states:
The purpose of this bill is to protect the investing public and honest busi-
ness. The basic policy is that of informing the investor of the facts concerning
securities to be offered for sale in interstate and foreign commerce and pro-*
viding protection against fraud and misrepresentation (emphasis added).
Id. The same emphasis on the investor is evident in the 1934 Act history. S. REP. No.
792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1934) states:
Subsection (b) authorizes the Commission by rules and regulations to prohibit
or regulate the use of any other manipulative or deceptive practices which it
finds detrimental to the interests of the investor (emphasis added).
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quires an objective element.
2. Plan of Distribution
This is a key factor, because it reflects the underlying purpose of
the securities laws.309 If the transaction is arm's-length and the in-
strument is specially designed as a result of those negotiations, the
note is not a security.
If multiple investors are similarly situated--even if the transaction
involved some separate negotiation-public distribution has occurred,
which makes the note a security. Once the note is publicly distrib-
uted, it is always covered by the Acts, even if the transaction at issue
was an arm's-length negotiation. 310 However, if the original distribu-
tion is merely a one-on-one exchange, it can attain security status if
the note is subsequently traded publicly.311
3. Reasonable Expectations of the Investing Public
When applying this factor to a note, the courts should look to the
average reasonable investor. Thus, the court should ask: if the aver-
Id.
309. The Legislative History of the Acts offers ample support for an argument that
Congress was concerned with speculation by vast segments of the public ignorant of
the underlying worth of their investment. See, e.g., 77 Cong. Rec. 2982-83 (1933)
(where Senator Fletcher stated, "People have been persuaded to invest their money in
securities without any information respecting them, except the advertisements put
forth by the agents or representatives of those issuing the securities."). The drafters
were also disturbed by pre-1929 market manipulations. Rep. Sabath remarked that "a
small group of men . . . ruthlessly manipulated the markets and brought about the
conditions from which the Nation is now suffering." 78 CONG. REC. 7689 (1934).
310. For example, even when the investors are both sophisticated, which occurs in
transactions involving the exchange of marketable securities by banks or corporations,
and an individually negotiated contract controls, the Securities Acts should cover the
transaction because of the nature of the instrument. The danger of allowing a security
to cease being a security was outlined by Professor Scott FitzGibbon in a 1980 article:
This approach would produce anomalous results, such as causing the same in-
strument to be a security at one time but not at another according to the type
of transaction involved, and causing some instruments to be deemed securities
and others of an identical issuer and class not to be, according to their differ-
ent trading patterns. Neither common usage nor the syntax of the securities
laws countenances such results, which would make a hash of some of the ma-
jor provisions.
Scott FitzGibbon, What is a Security?-A Redefinition Based on Eligibility to Partici-
pate in the Financial Markets, 64 MINN. L. REV. 893, 909 (1980).
311. Although this would require courts to view the same instrument as a non-se-
curity in one instance and as a security in another, the situation differs from the situa-
tion enumerated above. If an individually negotiated note could never be a security,
even if offered to hundreds or thousands of investors, it would allow issuers to circum-
vent the securities laws by entering into negotiated transactions first. The fact that
this potential is unacceptable is evidenced by the resale restrictions imposed by the
SEC on securities issued pursuant to a registration exemption. See Hicks, supra note
279. This restriction has become more critical as banks and savings and loans have be-
gun to create markets for their debt contracts.
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age reasonable person were a party to this transaction, what would
be his expectations? If the test is limited to the parties to this trans-
action, then the factor becomes meaningless because the first factor
already examines the expectations of these buyers.312 The courts
should use this factor to distinguish between unique and garden vari-
ety notes. In reality, as discussed above, this factor should be little
more than an objective check on the subjective motivations of the
buyer.313 The addition of this factor means that a buyer cannot turn
the transaction into a securities transaction by irrationally viewing
the deal. Nor can an unsuspecting buyer be denied the protection of
the securities laws merely because he or she did not perceive the in-
strument as an investment.
4. Presence of Other Risk-reducing Factors
First, only federal regulations should satisfy the Court's "alterna-
tive regulatory scheme" factor.314 The existence of alternative fed-
eral regulations removes the need for coverage by the securities acts
only if the alternative regulations provide a sufficient remedy for the
alleged wrongdoing. If the instrument is peripherally covered by ER-
ISA, but no remedy for fraud exists, then it should still be considered
a security.315 The remedy need not be as lucrative (such as treble
damages) nor as easy to attain through procedural advantages (such
as nationwide service of process). No state regulation should pre-
clude coverage since Blue Sky laws and common law fraud are
designed to supplement, not replace securities regulations.316
312. See supra notes 307-309 and accompanying text.
313. This distinction is essential to determining which instruments are securities.
In an early article on this topic, Professor Ronald Coffey argued that "a security is a
transaction whose characteristics distinguish it from the generality of transactions so
as to create a need for the special fraud procedures, protections, and remedies provided
by the securities laws." Ronald J. Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security" Is
There a More Meaningful Formula, 18 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 367, 373 (1967).
314. This appears to be the focus of Justice Marshall's opinion. Most courts have
followed this interpretation. See supra notes 296-98 and accompanying text.
315. Determining the jurisdictional scope of ERISA has been particularly trouble-
some for courts and beyond the scope of this Article.
316. As noted by Professor FitzGibbon:
It seems most unlikely that the lawmakers thought that fraud, inadequate dis-
closure, market manipulation, or many of the other things prohibited by the
securities laws were wrongful or undesirable only when securities were in-
volved. Evidently, they decided to legislate as to only some of the conduct
they believed wrongful-not an unusual procedure for lawmakers-with the
common law a.; a backstop, especially when they are federal lawmakers acting
during a major crisis in an area that is widely regulated at the state level.
FitzGibbon, supra note 310 at 912.
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Other elements of a transaction may sufficiently reduce its risk as
well. For example, collateral, if truly sufficient, may preclude the
need for coverage under the Acts. This is especially true when the
collateral is bargained for, which implies a one-on-one transaction.
If, however, the instrument is backed by nonexistent or insufficient
collateral, there is no risk reduction. Thus, this factor is not satisfied.
Finally, a short-term note, even if it is not commercial paper, is gen-
erally less risky than a long-term note. Therefore, if the other fac-
tors are met, and if the note has a maturity of nine months or less,
this final factor may be satisfied.
VII. CONCLUSION
Despite the Supreme Court's attempt in Reves to fashion a defini-
tive and uniform test to determine when a note is a security, incon-
sistencies and ambiguities have abounded from the case's application.
At least prior to Reves, one could anticipate with some certainty
which test would be applied depending on the circuit in which one
filed. Until the issues raised in this article are fully resolved, the
Reves decision provides little guidance or comfort.
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